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Abstract The local turn in good governance theory and prac-
tice responded to critiques of the ineffectiveness of state man-
agement and the inequity of privatization alternatives in natu-
ral resource management. Confounding expectations of great-
er effectiveness from decentralised governance, including
community-based natural resource management, however,
critics argue that expanded opportunities for elite capture have
become widely associated with program failures. This over-
view of theoretical controversies on leadership, patronage and
elite capture is part of a themed section in this issue that chal-
lenges assumptions across a wide range of current policy lit-
erature. It introduces a set of Indonesian case studies that
examine practices of local leaders and elites and seek to ac-
count in structural terms for appropriations both by (‘elite
capture’) and of (‘captured elites’) these key figures. These
studies explore the structural factors and co-governance prac-
tices most likely to promote effective participation of the full
spectrum of local interests in pursuit of better local natural
resource governance.
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Good governance and the local turn
A substantive policy literature has emerged over more than a
decade on the role of social capital, community empowerment
and local leadership in conservation and development pro-
grams (Jentoft et al. 1998; Woolcock 1998; Pretty and Ward
2001; Pretty et al. 2003; Pretty and Smith 2004; Lehtonen
2004; Bebbington et al. 2006; Mosse 2008; Plummer and
Fitz Gibbon 2006; Pretty 2006; Dasgupta and Beard 2007;
Bodin and Crona 2008; Woolcock 2010). This literature is
part of a wider discourse on ‘good governance’, which regards
transparency, accountability and social inclusion as basic
building blocks to equitable development and sustainable re-
source management outcomes (World Bank 2004; Batterbury
and Fernando 2006). With a strong focus on enhancing the
role of civil society through expanded public participation and
empowerment, decentralization of governance became a glob-
al aspect of the new strategy (World Bank 2002).
The turn to the local in good governance theory and practice
moved more recently from mainstream debates in development
policy circles into conservation literature1. There it met up with
a longer standing body of ‘commons’ scholarship reacting
against dominant readings of Hardin’s (1968) tragedy of the
commons allegory that had placed concerted policy emphasis
on the supposed advantages of state and private resource man-
agement (Ostrom 1990; Berkes and Folke 1998; Agrawal and
Ribot 1999). This earlier shift of focus away from the main-
stream predisposition toward centralised resource management
to community institutions in common property scholarship and
non-government organization circles responded to critiques
of the ineffectiveness of state management of resources
and the inequity of privatization alternatives (Ostrom et
al. 2002; Warren and McCarthy 2009; Cleaver 2012).
These debates were particularly relevant to the manage-
ment of apparently ‘open access’ forest and marine resources
1 Batterbury and Fernando (2006:1853) note the relative lack of consid-
eration of natural resource issues in the ‘good governance’ literature,
except as extensions of development studies findings.
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of the archipelagic and (once) heavily forested nation-state of
Indonesia (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995; Jentoft et al. 1998;
Visser 2004; Lowe 2006; Cribb and Ford 2009).
Neither public accountability nor efficient use of natural
resources was evident in the effective enclosure that resulted
from either private or state resource monopolies. Both state and
private appropriation of environmental goods had the effect of
excluding resource dependent communities that claimed legit-
imate rights to natural resources on the basis of precedence and
customary stewardship. Arguing that local communities or user
groups have both the local knowledge and ongoing interest in
the sustainability of these resources by virtue of direct depen-
dence, the community-based turn in conservation and develop-
ment interventions became an increasingly strong trend in pol-
icy circles over recent decades (Agrawal and Gibson 2001;
Brosius et al. 2005; Grafton 2005; Berkes 2007).
In Indonesia the local turn coincided with reformist moves
toward political democratization and decentralization and the
weakening of the state’s role in both conservation and devel-
opment policy spheres after the fall of the Suharto regime in
1998 (Aspinall and Fealy 2003; Patlis 2008; Hadiz 2010).
Consequently, social and environmental NGOs found them-
selves uncomfortable bedfellows with neoliberal proponents
of decentralized governance from the World Bank and other
global conservation and development agencies in community
interventions ostensibly aimed at accountability and commu-
nity empowerment (Harriss 2001; Hadiz 2004; Mansuri and
Rao 2013). Pursuant to the local turn in conservation circles,
social research and policy debate has focused on how to en-
gage community-wide participation and ensure equitable shar-
ing of the costs and benefits of natural resource management,2
particularly among the most marginalized social groups –
women, minorities, the poor – in order to protect both envi-
ronmental values and human rights, which became ever more
closely interdependent in global discourse.
The results of these community-based interventions have
been equivocal, however. Community-based natural resource
management (CBNRM), began to confront problems arising
from an idealized model of ‘community’ structures and a lack
of appreciation of the political and economic inequalities that had
obscured the differential effects of programs whose benefits and
burdens were not fairly distributed and often led to perverse
outcomes (McCay 2001; Veron et al. 2006; Bené et al. 2009).
The result is that the pendulum swing in good governance theory
and policy from centralized orientations of the 1970s and 1980s,
to international enthusiasm for decentralization in the following
decades, now seems to be groping toward some middle ground
involving nested governance and multi-stakeholder co-manage-
ment approaches (Ostrom 2010; Marschke 2012: 16–22).
Neo-Liberal Good Governance Discourse
and the Community-Based Agenda
Critics point to significant gaps, ambiguities and contradictions
in the theoretical frameworks and case-study evidence sur-
rounding community-based conservation and development in-
terventions that indicate serious disjunctions between theory
and practice (Harriss 1997; Fine 2001; Harriss 2001;
Bebbington et al. 2004; Gray 2005; Li 2007; Mosse 2008;
Mansuri and Rao 2013; Saunders 2014). Key areas of continu-
ing debate are the focus of unresolved dilemmas for conserva-
tion and development programs: First of all, there are funda-
mental tensions between the goals of inclusive socio-economic
development and conservation strategies, because most natural
resource dependent growth is ultimately implicated in resource
depletion. Regulated restraint aimed at conservation typically
falls on those most directly dependent on the resource and least
able to resist effective ‘enclosure’ by government, the private
sector, or international conservation agencies’ management
strategies. At the same time, resource depletion also hurts the
poorest users most, since those with substantial capital can
more readily shift their enterprise elsewhere.
Secondly, persistent failures to achieve either conserva-
tion or equitable livelihood objectives through so many of
these community participation initiatives led critics to ques-
tion assumptions that institutional design can provide
straightforward solutions to natural resource management
issues. Not least, critical attention from political economy
and political ecology research reminds us that local power
structures are often highly asymmetrical. As a consequence
elite domination has become the focal point of much debate
concerning limitations of community-based conservation
and development programs (Hadiz 2004; Platteau 2004;
Bebbington 2007; Dasgupta and Beard 2007; Bené et al.
2009; Lund and Saito-Jensen 2013).
Research suggests a disturbing but predictable association
between pre-existing structural inequalities and the ineffec-
tiveness of socio-economic development and environmental
protection interventions. These failures are widely attributed
to capture3 of institutions and resources by elite interests
2 Compliance cannot be assured without general perceptions of fairness
in process and outcomes, and ultimately trust in the legitimacy and en-
durance of governance arrangements. Effective inclusion of stakeholders
in decision-making processes is argued to be necessary to assure owner-
ship of rules that attempt to match resource access and stewardship
(Grafton 2005; Fritzen 2007).
3 Following Dasgupta and Beard (2007), we distinguish between ‘elite
control’ over resources and project interventions that provide access to
benefits for non-elites, and ‘elite capture’ of project benefits, which refers
to ‘the process by which [local elites] dominate and corrupt community-
level planning and governance’ (Dasgupta and Beard 2007:230). See
Batterbury and Fernando (2006:1853ff) for more detailed coverage of
generally accepted definitions of elite capture in the development and
environment literature. The concept extends to informal as well as formal
spheres of influence and mechanisms of appropriation. See also Lund and
Saito-Jensen (2013).
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(Bardhan 2002; Platteau 2004). Platteau writes, local elites
Btend to appropriate a larger share of the transfers in commu-
nities that are highly unequal to begin with^ (2004:230). More
positively, some authors assert a strong relationship between
levels of broad political participation and the potential for
constraint on elite capture at all scales of governance
(Bardhan 2002:194; Mansuri and Rao 2013:10), an argument
that is pursued in the collection of case studies that follows.
This essay introduces case studies on the role of leadership
and local elites in resource governance in Indonesia, and their
implications for wider debates on leadership, elite capture and
good governance. Several of our cases suggest structural con-
ditions in which ‘captured elites’ may be an appropriate de-
scriptor for situations in which social relationships and expec-
tations drive leaders to instigate or support collective actions
well beyond self-interested considerations. Fritzen (2007),
concluding his analysis of 250 community-driven develop-
ment projects in Indonesia, finds that despite the pervasive-
ness of elite control of decision-making boards, the degree of
elite involvement bore no direct relationship to capture of
project benefits. Rather, he found ‘… the degree of democratic
selection of community boards emerges … as a consistent,
significant predictor of pro-poor, pro-accountability disposi-
tions and competent boards’ (Fritzen 2007:1370).
Nonetheless, considerable obstacles stand in the way of
genuine democratic practice at all scales of governance.
While opportunities disproportionately avail to local elites
by virtue of political connections to external traders and gov-
ernment agencies, it is also the case that ordinary villagers
sometimes benefit from collusive behavior. Reluctance of lo-
cal leaders to strictly enforce internal community sanctions for
violation of resource management rules or to take collective
action to resolve generally understood local environmental
crises is a notable feature of governance arrangements where
personal and community relationships might be jeopardized
by strict law enforcement, as shown in several of the studies of
leadership and elite capture in this themed section.4
Finally, associated with the question of entrenched hierar-
chy and inequality in the local domain has been evidence of
the exclusions or at the very least intractable constraints on the
scope for agency among marginalized groups who are likely
to be bypassed in economic development interventions and
disproportionately affected by new regulatory conservation
regimes (Adhikari and Goldey 2010). In this regard, the extent
of legitimate and representative leadership and the search for
mechanisms to respond to elite capture in their absence be-
come central to these ongoing debates (Arnall et al. 2013:309;
Laerhoven and Ostrom 2007:11; Lund and Saito-Jensen
2013).
Leadership and Elite Capture: Debates
The articles that follow in this volume focus on the extent to
which local leaders and elites use their roles to ensure that
natural resources serve broad, long-term common good out-
comes. The concept of leadership in the literature generally
refers to people who may be elected or appointed to formal
positions in governance structures, whether traditional forms
of governance (customary adat in the Indonesian context) or
state structures of public administration from local to national
level. References to local leaders here generally refer to those
who hold an acknowledged position within traditional or state
governance structures at hamlet and village levels (Uphoff
1986:11; Arnall et al. 2013) or who hold positions of respect
and influence based on social or economic roles. Concepts of
leaders and elites are regularly used interchangeably in the
literature, on the assumption that local leaders are typically if
not always drawn from established and/or advantaged eco-
nomic and social status groups (Dasgupta and Beard
2007:238). Instead of automatically conflating leadership
and elite status, or taking rent-seeking interests of the local
elite for granted, the papers in this issue look at the articulation
between horizontal and vertical power relations, and consider
internal alliances and frictions among local elites, as well as
engagements with external actors and institutions, particularly
in relation to natural resource management.
The collection of case studies presented in this issue also
connects with debates in the development and conservation
literature on ‘social capital’ and the structural conditions need-
ed to achieve sustainability and equity ends. Contributors to
these debates tend to diverge along lines we might describe as
pragmatic policy-oriented versus critical theory approaches:
the one strand follows Putnam et al.’s (1993) interest in the
capacities of social groups to use horizontal associations and
normative values to achieve institutional bases for collective
action and common good outcomes. The second, using a par-
ticular reading of Bourdieu’s (Bourdieu 1990[1980]; 1986)
approach to social capital, focuses on the more instrumental
use of social and symbolic resources by individual actors and
social groups to achieve advantage (Harriss 1997, 2001; Fine
2001).
Application of the Putnam approach feeds into research
that is focused on community capacity for common good col-
lective action, and tends to treat leadership in its functional
role, predicated on local social norms and reciprocal relations.
Allied approaches include the moral economy literature inves-
tigating the bases of social solidarities and subaltern strategies
that revolve around social security, reputation and mutual aid
(Scott 1976; Cleaver 2012), as well as policy literature that
4 See also Steenbergen (2013) and Gunawan and Visser (2012) where
village fishing sanctions that apply in principle to both community mem-
bers and outsiders are in practice only seriously imposed on non-related
outsiders.
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assumes the functional necessity of engaging effective repre-
sentative leadership through institutional design (Ostrom
1990; Fritzen 2007). Nonetheless, as Uphoff (1986:10) ar-
gues, what is called a ‘community’ may or may not provide
a substantial social basis for collective action. In the
Indonesian context explored in this themed issue, the adat
community may include the whole customary village (as in
the Bali case) or may be differentiated into the core and non-
core families of the village (as in the Moluccas case).
‘Community’ as the basis for collective action need not be a
geographically defined entity, but may refer to the more dis-
persed context of a patron’s network or clientele (as in the
Kalimantan case).
Bourdieu’s (Bourdieu 1990[1980]; Bourdieu 1986) ap-
proach on the other hand concerns the reproduction of hierar-
chy and advantage through deployment of social and symbol-
ic forms of capital that privilege strategically positioned and
culturally sanctioned status and wealth groups. The transfor-
mation of symbolic capital into economic capital, and vice
versa, where structure and agency are mutually dependent, is
also key to our understanding of the role of local leadership
and patronage in present-day Indonesian societies. Bourdieu’s
approach to elite domination has become the foundation of a
body of literature focusing on the reproduction of power hier-
archies and their effects on governance. It underpins elite cap-
ture assumptions and seeks to explain how ineffective and
inequitable policy outcomes persistently result from asymmet-
rical structural characteristics of communities and social
groups (most explicitly evidenced in the Sumatran case).
However, as Bebbington (2007:160) argues, this focus on
vertical power relations obscures the existence of other ‘dis-
interested’ and cooperative forms of local leadership and so-
cial action based on horizontal solidarities.
Focus on Indonesia
The case study articles that follow analyze the roles and posi-
tions of local leaders and/or elites with regard to critical local
resource governance issues in Indonesia (see Fig. 1 for case
study locations). Indonesia presents a rich ground for compar-
ative case studies. The Indonesian cases we explore represent
a diverse set of cultural and environmental contexts within the
framework of a single rapidly developing and democratizing
nation-state that has committed to a dramatic decentralization
of governance as part of the reform process since the fall of the
Suharto regime in 1998 (Aspinall and Fealy 2003; Hadiz
2010; Satria et al. 2006; Patlis 2008). This concentration on
single-country case studies enables us to look in depth at
questions of leadership and elite control within the same for-
mal state governmental framework, in local contexts that at
the same time present different types of ‘community’, with
different ethnic compositions, different local histories and dif-
ferent resource bases. This formal legal baseline enabled us to
address Agrawal’s (2002) call to explore the gap in under-
standing how the complexities of context explain differential
outcomes.5
In tandem with the reconfiguration of governance through
decentralization in the post-Suharto reform era, villages across
Indonesia have been subjects of a concerted program of
community-based empowerment interventions prompted by
the World Bank’s Social Capital Initiative (World Bank
2002). This community-driven approach to local development
5 Similar concerns to address the complexities of context are expressed by
a number of analysts of community-based resource management and
development issues (Bebbington et al. 2006:1963; Fritzen 2007:1373;
Laerhoven and Ostrom 2007:11; Lund and Saito-Jensen 2013:104).
Fig. 1 Map of Indonesia: Case study locations
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has been taken up by the Yudhoyono government and imple-
mented across the country under the label of the National
Community Empowerment Program (PNPM) (Bebbington
et al. 2006; McCarthy et al. 2014). PNPM provided a pan-
Indonesian intervention designed to broaden the role of civil
society in order to maximize community involvement and
minimize elite capture. Among other objectives, the research
reported in this collection of case studies investigated the ex-
tent to which this and analogous community-based interven-
tions in local conservation as well as development programs
succeeded in enhancing public engagement in local gover-
nance, and whether participatory reforms translated into better
resource management and fairer distribution of benefits.
The twin processes of decentralization and democratization
of governance in Indonesia since the dramatic fall of the
Suharto regime in 1998 – that was partly catalyzed by emerg-
ing human rights and environmental movements – offered
opportunities to put discourses of community participation
and empowerment into practice (Eldridge 1995; Hirsch and
Warren 1998; Peluso et al. 2008; Warren and McCarthy
2009). There has been an implicit assumption accompanying
the good governance focus in international policy circles that
political decentralization would bring management closer to
those who directly depend on natural resources, stimulating
conditions for improving the position of previously marginal-
ized groups as well as degraded environments (World Bank
2002; Bardhan 2002; Batterbury and Fernando 2006; Ribot
et al. 2006). Scholars and policy makers assumed that at local
scales it would be easier to build on local knowledge and
synergies and to tighten the links between incentives and ac-
countabilities (Resosudarmo 2004; Patlis 2008). Evaluations
of these local participation and empowerment programs have
beenmixed, however. Confounding expectations of efficiency
and effectiveness from democratized and decentralized gover-
nance, including community-based natural resource manage-
ment, evidence of expanded opportunities for elite control and
capture have become widely associated with decentralization
policies (Aspinall and Fealy 2003; Blaikie 2005; Brosius et al.
2005; Wardell and Lund 2006; Hadiz 2010).
Leadership in Community-Based Conservation
and Development Programs
With respect to the environment, the need to internalize access
rights and responsibilities for the protection of natural re-
sources in order to avoid the proverbial tragedy of the com-
mons was a prominent trope underpinning decentralization
and community-based management policies and practices
(Warren and McCarthy 2009; Adhikari et al. 2014). Some
evidence of better targeted service delivery as a result of
decentralized and participatory governance experiments has
been reported among reviews of community development
programs (Bardhan 2002; Bebbington et al. 2006), although
not the thoroughgoing institutional transformations or em-
powerment that had been predicted earlier (Batterbury and
Fernando 2006:1853; Bené et al. 2009). The picture is yet
more qualified for community-based environmental gover-
nance interventions. Because conservation programs typically
require restricted or deferred benefit, different dynamics may
be invoked and different leadership qualities required. Indeed,
trade-offs between social and environmental protection are
difficult to avoid (Wardell and Lund 2006).
Non-government organizations often act as brokers in ne-
gotiating these trade-offs between state, corporations and local
communities or user groups – toward local resource access
(the primary focus of grassroots and human rights NGOs) or
environmental protection goals (typically the concern of glob-
al conservation agencies). They tend to seek engagement with
different types of leadership and at different scales, depending
upon their donor support base (see, for example, Steenbergen
2013; Kusumawati, 2014). Environmental protection goals
have been rather heavy-handedly pursued by the large inter-
national conservation agencies whose impacts can be equal to
those of governments in some regions (Batterbury and
Fernando 2006:1856; Afiff and Lowe 2008).
Local elites may be less able to avail themselves of rent-
seeking opportunities through conservation interventions
(typically aimed at restricting resource access) than is the case
with externally funded programs aimed at community devel-
opment. Nonetheless, established local figures may seek to
enhance their authority as brokers for NGO environmental
projects in an effort to appropriate institutional resources and
build reputation and networks. For their part, external partners
(NGOs, state agencies and private corporations) find it diffi-
cult to commit to time-consuming local participation process-
es and may be inclined to engage whatever legitimacy local
customary or official administrative leaders possess in a mu-
tually bolstering process.
Case Studies of Leadership and Participation
in Local Resource Governance
The case studies presented in this volume are based on
grounded, long-term field research across a range of
Indonesian societies and resource bases in Sumatra,
Kalimantan, the Moluccas and Bali (see locations Fig. 1).6
They address questions of leadership and participation in local
resource governance and in empowerment programs
6 This research formed part of a wider comparative project on ‘Social
Capital, Natural Resources and Local Governance in Indonesia’, funded
by the Australian Research Council (DP0880961). The project involved
among others, Lucas, Steenbergen, Visser and Warren, whose ethno-
graphic field research forms the basis of the case studies presented in this
volume.
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introduced by central government and non-government orga-
nizations. They give attention to the inclusions and exclusions
of particular social groups and roles, as well as the conditions
accounting for effective or perverse outcomes in resource con-
servation and development programs. The studies explore the
characteristics of local customary leaders, political and eco-
nomic elites as well as investigating how they deploy avail-
able forms of local power, authority, influence and
representation.
The case studies seek to account in structural terms for
appropriations both by (elite capture) and of (captured elites)
these key figures, and to identify the kinds of leadership and
co-governance practices most likely to accommodate the
sometimes conflicting implications of conservation and devel-
opment programs, and to promote effective participation of
the full spectrum of local interests and identities. Their argu-
ments resonate with other recent studies that have pointed to
the need to harness elite skills and resources and explore what
accounts for ‘benevolent’ engagement as well as ‘pernicious’
capture of project benefits and decision-making mechanisms
(Fritzen 2007; James 2011; Knudsen 2013).
The account by Lucas of corruption in two Sumatran case
study villages describes the classic condition of elite capture
of development project funds through systematic rent-seeking
behavior that features so prominently in the aid and develop-
ment literature. The cuts, kickbacks and other illegal payments
from project interventions blatantly demanded by local offi-
cials replicate a model of rent-seeking that dominated central
government cronyism in Indonesia under the centralized and
authoritarian Suharto regime. Indeed the reform process in
Indonesia is widely regarded as having been hijacked by the
decentralization of corruption through the ‘money politics’
that have dominated the reform era since 1998 (Aspinall and
Fealy 2003; Hadiz 2010). The two Sumatran cases described
by Lucas involve examples of nepotism, misappropriation and
collusion by village officials with government superiors and
local clients. Nonetheless, in one of his two cases, factional
divisions and competition among the village elite
counteracted corrupt tendencies and managed to serve public
interest reasonably well in the instance of a water supply pro-
ject. Local officials also collaborated with an Indonesian con-
servation NGO in reinstating and adapting customary resource
protection regulations, now recognized alongside the official
village administrative framework.
The Kusumawati–Visser study of a turtle conservation pro-
gram in coastal Kalimantan is focussed on patron-client net-
works rather than on ‘village communities’. It looks critically
at patronage in its broader social context, as opposed to the
narrowly political and economic frameworks that almost by
definition treat the asymmetrical dimensions of these relation-
ships as impediments to conservation and development pro-
gram success. The authors argue that the narrow focus of
international donors on ‘elite capture’ glosses over the internal
diversity and political–economic differentiation of interests
among members of local elites. It also risks losing the poten-
tial for ‘capturing the elite’ and recruiting the social and his-
torical authority, environmental knowledge, organizational
skills and redistributive capacities of economic patrons, thus
precluding the possibility of partnering with their resource-
dependent clients. Kusumawati and Visser take a more con-
structive approach to dealing with local hierarchies in the
Kalimantan case. They ask how the positive aspects of patron-
age relationships, so pervasive in artisanal fisheries in terms of
credit, technology and social security provision (Gunawan
and Visser 2012), might be accommodated in conservation
and management interventions. As Ferrol-Schulte et al.
(2014:63) argue, BAlthough patrons have been identified …
to be drivers of resource exploitation, they are also potential
agents in identifying and activating sustainable solutions to
environmental decline and improving fishing household
resilience.^ The active engagement of trusted patrons might
also bring valuable local knowledge and legitimacy to the
interventions of outside conservation agents, who typically
lack the legal status, credibility and grounded relationships
that long-standing local exchange networks could bring to
regulatory efforts.
In the Moluccan community studied by Steenbergen in this
issue, customary (adat) leaders wielded considerable authority,
boosted by their role in negotiating NGO– facilitated conserva-
tion agreements. It is notable that the community’s customary
leadership independently recognized the need for coastal re-
source protection measures following declines in yield of im-
portant marine resources, which ultimately prompted local
overtures for partnership with a small Indonesia-based NGO
that has a strong commitment to local management. The
NGO depended heavily on customary leadership and processes
for implementation of new conservation programs. Advantages
accrued to the dominant local adat group as a result of external
agency collaboration that facilitated formal acknowledgement
of customary institutions, reinforcing the leadership position of
this group.Marginalization of ethnic minorities was a feature of
local decision-making here as in the Sumatran cases described
by Lucas, although the extent and implications remain open to
interpretation.
The Bali case presented by Warren focuses on two dimen-
sions of leadership arising from local horizontal and vertical
ties that bind different types of leadership to the wider com-
munity in different ways. Political and economic dependen-
cies, as well as local solidarities based on customary commu-
nity membership, kinship, ethnic and religious identity, bear
on an incident of local decision-making failure that did not
initially involve external intervention. Indeed, state law en-
forcement was uncharacteristically regarded as one of the
missing links required for resolving several of the major local
resource management issues in this coastal community. In her
study of the failure of local leaders to gain consensus for
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restricting seaweed harvesting for the sake of coastal conser-
vation, customary hamlet and fishing cooperative leaders –
who are typically regarded as first among equals in contrast
to elites within the formal government hierarchy – were un-
able or unwilling to deploy the various forms of authority
associated with their leadership positions to deal with the clas-
sic tragedy of the commons situation that unfolded in this
Balinese village. The local leaders and political elites of
Warren’s study presented themselves as captured by the very
bonds that are theoretically assumed to catalyse collective
action. Instead they found themselves paralysed, despite wide-
ly shared views on the urgent need for environmental rule-
making. They were unable to deal with the damaging conse-
quences of the seaweed harvest, until a different conjuncture
with state policies produced a changed climate for action.
Time and Context: Historical and Cultural
Interdependencies
The Kusumawati-Visser and Warren studies share Wong’s
(2010) concern with the importance of understanding the mul-
tiple character of relationships (cultural, social, economic, po-
litical) between leaders, elites and non-elites, especially at
local level where they are socially embedded by history and
proximity. At the same time, both studies find that the charac-
ter of leaders’ relationships with external agencies and gov-
ernment authorities were crucial contextual aspects of gover-
nance that had to be engaged if effective synergies and endur-
ing outcomes were to result. The Bali case demonstrates, on
the one hand, that activating horizontal relationships through
democratic institutions and associational ties will not automat-
ically assure positive environmental outcomes, at least in the
short term. In that case, avoiding internal conflict in an eco-
nomically depressed context made environmental action for
the long term common good difficult for local leaders.
Conversely, the Kalimantan case shows that it should not be
assumed that asymmetric patronage relations will by defini-
tion obstruct progressive social and conservation improve-
ments, and indeed could facilitate them (such as through con-
trolled exploitation of turtle eggs) by keeping political–eco-
nomic relations transparent, a policy approach that was be-
yond the scope of the international NGO’s agenda.
In this regard we concur with Arnall et al. (2013), whose
research on community-driven development programs in
Mozambique leads them to conclude that practitioners must
take account of the internal diversity and complexity of what
is often glossed together as ‘the’ local elite, their contributions,
as well as their capacity to derail and divert remedial efforts. In
particular, they point to the informal checks and balances that
may be rooted in local norms and practices. This point refers
us to the implications of the ‘linking’ (vertical) type of social
capital which gave local elites in all our cases strategic access
to external information and resources that could be activated
for the benefit of community and user groups and/or manipu-
lated to their personal advantage in different circumstances. It
is only by way of detailed and long-term ethnographic study
of local leadership that such checks and balances can be
unearthed, or their absence revealed, as shown in the
Sumatran cases.
Warren’s work on the horizontal pressures that can be
brought to bear by ordinary villagers on local leadership, and
Steenbergen’s study of dispersed adat leadership are also con-
sistent with Arnall et al.’s (2013) stress on the formal and in-
formal constraints that non-elites place on leadership through
the ballot box and normative expectations of balanced and
generalized reciprocity in certain social contexts. Knudsen
(2013) and Bankoff (2015) argue similarly for the importance
of recognizing a distinctive personalized type of informal,
neighborhood-level leadership that is horizontal, grounded in
local values, notions of community service and collective re-
sponsibility, one that is not adequately encompassed by patron–
client models. Lucas’ case study of systematic corruption in his
Sumatran cases, on the other hand, leads us to question asser-
tions by Arnall et al. (2013:312) that locally based ‘check and
balance’mechanisms are likely to be more efficient than exter-
nally imposed ones. Both the Lucas and Steenbergen cases
show that intervening NGO programs can contribute toward
expanding the framework of governance toward greater inclu-
sion of women and to a lesser extent ethnic minorities, although
Steenbergen shows that NGOs tend to be averse to the risks of
becoming involved in internal conflicts because of threat to
their donor base. The findings of both the Moluccan and the
Kalimantan cases indicate that the interplay between culturally
and historically framed horizontal and vertical relationships
greatly impact upon the effectiveness of conservation
interventions.
It is clear from these case studies that time and context
dynamics – including those prompted by external interven-
tions – may shift processes and outcomes substantially. In
their studies of elite capture and participatory initiatives in
Tanzania and India, Lund and Saito-Jensen (2013:104) found
that Binitial elite capture of the participatory initiatives was
circumvented over time through various forms of resistance
orchestrated by initially disadvantaged groups.^ They argue
that studies of elite capture should be based on in-depth and
longitudinal empirical investigations that carefully character-
ize forms and outcomes of elite capture and consider both the
changing dynamics of social settings and the perceptions held
by the people under study.
These studies pursue with ethnographic depth the changing
constellations of relationships between local leaders/patrons/
elites and those whose interests they claim to represent in
contexts of resource decline and varying degrees of external
government and non-government organization intervention.
They also fill an important gap by including cases of the still
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rather understudied issue of local governance in rapidly de-
clining marine resource contexts.
Concluding Considerations
The studies of elite capture and leadership in this Themed
Section expose the changing dynamics of decentralized local
resource management in diverse Indonesian contexts. Nested,
transparent and accountable7 governance based on democratic
and inclusive decision-making at all scales appears to be a
basic pre-requisite that is necessary if not sufficient for the
transformation of exploitative scenarios linking human and
natural resources. The kinds of leadership that emerge from
the case studies presented here characterize the leadership-
elite capture spectrum, from progressive examples of respon-
sive leadership, at the one end, to outright corruption at the
other extreme, and in between by embedded patronage net-
works and captured elites whose commitments and capacities
to lead may be directed or compromised in the interplay be-
tween horizontal and vertical pressures and between personal
and collective, short- and long-term interests. Not uncommon-
ly, the same actors display several types of agency over time
and in different contexts. Collective identities and personal
agency often prove ambivalent forces in the commons dramas
that emerge from this interplay and that are particularly acute
in marine and forest resource dependent communities, such as
those described in these case studies.
While the systematic misappropriation of development
project funds in the Sumatran case reflected a particularly
predatory form of elite capture, the customary leaders who
were the key figures in the Moluccan community apparently
devoted their considerable cultural and social capital to both
conservation and community development goals. Here, local
leaders’ traditional customary standing as leaders of patrilineal
kinship groups was consolidated by their engagement with an
environmental NGO. At the same time, this case study de-
scribes a form of leadership that was also apparently aimed
at preserving and expanding the local ‘commonweal’ (Warren
and McCarthy 2009). Collaboration between customary el-
ders and young ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ (Cleaver 2012)
effectively engineered external engagements and internal
distributions.
The Moluccan case also supports the argument of the
Kalimantan study that engaging local leaders and elites as
suspect yet potentially valuable brokers for project interven-
tions may help control their practices if effectively ‘captured’
by NGO partners. The capacities and commitments of local
leaders and ordinary villagers may be drawn upon (or com-
promised) by these external partnerships. Fritzen (2007)
stresses the importance of democratic selection and serious
capacity building in accounting for benevolent engagement
of leaderships as opposed to pernicious elite capture.
Imperfect as the local interventions intended to extend democ-
ratized governance may be, as Arnall et al. argue, NGOs
Bneed to recognize and make the most of what accountability
mechanisms already exist^ (Arnall et al. 2013:328). Our stud-
ies give depth and detail to the complex, nuanced and often
ambivalent relationships out of which new sensibilities,
practices and rules may become established and contribute,
through forms of what Cleaver (2012) calls ‘institutional bri-
colage’, toward more sustainable development.
As decentralized governance in the new millennium brings
more power to local leaders there is a critical need to carry out
such in-depth, long-term studies of changing power constel-
lations from local to global spheres, and to work toward the
capture of elites by strengthening both horizontal and vertical
institutional checks and balances. In this regard, an important
legislative change in Indonesia’s decentralized local gover-
nance regime undoubtedly had regressive effects on the ac-
countability objectives of the original legal reforms. Local
councils at village level (BPD), which had initially been fully
elected and independent of the executive, were converted to
consultative bodies without independent powers. These were
once again subordinated to the village head in the 2004 revi-
sions of Indonesia’s 1999 decentralization laws, severely
impairing their check and balance role. Further revisions
through the new Village Law of 2014 may yet re-establish a
balance between executive and legislative arms in local gov-
ernment, however.
Not to be forgotten then, in this consideration of the relation
between leaders and followers, vertical and horizontal forces,
in local decision-making on resource management, are the
national and global forces that articulate with the local.
These have become everyday sites of engagement where elites
and other local leaders play critical roles in brokering accom-
modation or resistance to often contending economic devel-
opment and conservation interests. There is a need to institu-
tionalize more effective internal participatory community
monitoringmechanisms to increase transparency and account-
ability of officials at the village level as well as external au-
thorities at the sub-district and district levels. This will become
all the more important as the community development and
empowerment funding previously processed through the
PNPM program has now been incorporated in modified form
into the Village Law of 2014, substantially increasing the
power and resources of village level structures.
Undoubtedly, there has been some convergence between
reform-minded activist and neo-liberal agendas in rescaling
power and resource allocation to local institutions
7 Veron et al. (2006:1922), based on empirical studies of the Employment
Assurance Scheme in ruralWest Bengal, argue that two-way accountabil-
ities are critical. BWhen these vertical accountabilities are weak, horizon-
tal accountability structures between local civil society and officials can
mutate into networks of corruption in which ‘community’ actors become
accomplices or primary agents.^
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(Hutchison et al. 2014). Established power relations and the
mechanisms through which the local domain has been incor-
porated into asymmetric globalizing political and economic
systems undoubtedly pose formidable, but also contestable,
structural impediments to achieving inclusive and sustainable
social and environmental protection goals. We have attempted
in this set of case studies to address the internal dynamics
driving leadership in the local governance of resources in the
context of profoundly important articulations with national
and global forces, government and non-government
institutions.
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